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 ABSTRACT  
This paper elaborates on results of a recent risk analysis study for RoPax vessels, carried out as 
part of the activities of the SAFEDOR Integrated Project, targeting possible improvements on 
safety levels following large scale flooding.  The study is based on a comprehensive analysis of 
accident statistics for the period 1994-2004, through which a high-level risk model (in the form 
of event trees) is established.  This is then used to determine the current safety level of RoPax 
vessels (in various risk metrics, such as individual risk, potential loss of life and on an F-N 
curve), reconfirming that even though safety levels are improving, risk is still “high in the 
ALARP region”.  In search of ways to further improve the situation possible risk control options 
are examined, by performing a sensitivity analysis on the effects of the Attained Index of 
Subdivision A onto the safety levels and by evaluating their cost-effectiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main consequences on a RoPax following an accident may be graceful sinking or capsize 
and/or fire which can result in great loss of life among the passengers and crew onboard.  The 
focus of this paper is on the evaluation of potential risk control options relating to credible 
accident scenarios that may lead to large scale flooding, using a high-level risk model.  The work 
has been performed in accordance with the IMO FSA Guidelines [IMO, 2002]. 
At IMO, regulations on subdivision and damage stability of RoPax ships (SOLAS Chapter II-1) 
have received considerable attention over the years.  Currently, the global standard for damage 
stability of RoPax ships is the vessel to be able to sustain any two-compartment damage and also 
fulfilling a set of deterministic requirements known as SOLAS 90.  This represents a significant 
improvement with the standards applicable at the beginning of 1990s.  In North West Europe, an 
increased standard is applied for existing ships, known as the “Stockholm Agreement” or 
SOLAS 90+50, which requires either fulfillment of the deterministic standards of SOLAS 90 
with an additional height of water on deck (maximum of 50 cm), or the demonstration by means 
of model experiments that the vessel can survive in damaged conditions the sea state at the area 
of operation. 
The IMO’s Sub-Committee on Subdivision, Load Lines and Fishing Vessel Safety (SLF) has 
developed a new set of probabilistic rules for all ship types for global application from 2009 
onwards.  These rules follow the approach developed at Resolution A.265 (IMO issued this 
resolution at 1974, as an alternative to the deterministic SOLAS damage stability requirements) 
and are mainly based on extensive research work carried out at the late 1990s / early 2000s as 
part of the activities of the EC-funded research project HARDER. 
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Following background information on the risk acceptance criteria used and an overview of 
relevant accident statistics, the paper provides details of the high-level risk model developed, 
discusses potential risk control options and evaluates their risk reduction potential as well as their 
cost-effectiveness.  On the basis of these considerations some recommendations on appropriate 
safety levels of RoPax ships are given. 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Risk Acceptance Criteria  
The following outlines the acceptance criteria used in this study for individual risk (passengers 
and crew members) and for societal risk. 
Individual risk is usually expressed as the frequency of an individual fatality per year.  
MSC72/16 proposes criteria for individual risk for shipping operations at the same level as those 
used by the UK Health and Safety Executive.  These criteria are reproduced below for 
passengers and crew members.   
Boundary between negligible risk and the ALARP area 10-6 per year 
Maximum tolerable risk for passengers (risks below this limit should be made ALARP) 10-4 per year 
Maximum tolerable risk for crew members (risks below this limit should be made ALARP)  10-3 per year 
Societal risk acceptance criteria for RoPax ships are established in the SAFEDOR public 
deliverable D4.5.2 (Risk Acceptance Criteria), in accordance with to the approach presented in 
document MSC 72/16, i.e. based on the economic importance of RoPax shipping. These criteria 
are presented in Figure 1. 
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Accident Statistics  
A thorough casualty statistics analysis has been carried out, based on historical data for the 
period 1994-2004, obtained by the Lloyds Maritime Information Unit (LMIU) and on fleet 
statistics for the same period, obtained by Lloyds Register Fairplay (LRFP). 
The LMIU casualty database includes 1,147 incidents for RoPax ships world-wide for the period 
1994-2004.  42 of the incidents included in the database have occurred on RoPax ships of 100 to 
1,000 GRT.  These are excluded from the analysis due to the fact that these smaller ships are 
usually engaged on short crossings and passages and are often of an open-type configuration and 
hence are not representative for a generic risk analysis study on RoPax ships (typically of a 
closed-type configuration and with part of her trip exposed to weather). 
54 incidents have happened during repairs or conventions, labour and other disputes, on vessels 
that were already laid-up or to be broken up (9 incidents for RoPax of 1,000 to 4,000 GRT range 
and 45 incidents for RoPax of 4,000 GRT and above).  These incidents have also not been taken 
into account in the analysis.  Finally, there were a further 3 incidents which are attributed as acts 
of terrorism (notably one explosion involving considerable number of fatalities), which have also 
not been taken into account in the analysis. 
Table 1 contains an analysis of the LMIU RoPax casualty data for the period 1994-2004, for 
RoPax of 1,000 GRT and above.  Casualty records held by LMIU classify incidents as serious 
and non-serious.  An incident is considered as serious if it has involved a single or multiple 
fatalities, damage to the vessel that has interrupted her service or if the vessel has been lost. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the F-N for RoPax based on world-wide operation for the period 1994-2006 
(i.e. including the Al Salam Boccaccio 98 incident, which caught fire on 3 February 2006 
resulting in 1,000 fatalities among the 1,300 people onboard).  The figure also includes, for 
comparison purposes, the F-N line representing experience with fatal incidents in North West 
Europe during the period 1978-1994.  
Comparison on the F-N curve of the potential loss of life of the period 1994-2006 worldwide 
with North West European experience for the period 1978-1994, demonstrates a considerable 
risk reduction, however, it also demonstrates that risk is still high at the ALARP region. 
RISK MODELLING  
Based on the results of a HAZID session purposely organised (SAFEDOR, 2006) and the 
analysis of available accident statistics, as presented in the foregoing and summarized in 
Table 1, five generic top events were selected for further analysis, namely: 
• Collision 
• Grounding (incidents classified by LMIU as “wrecked/stranded”) 
• Impact (incidents classified by LMIU as “contact”)  
• Other flooding (incidents classified by LMIU as “hull damage” and “foundered”) 
• Fire / Explosion  
The next step in risk modelling was to assess the expected consequences for each of the 
identified events. This was done using event trees, i.e. by constructing and quantifying a 
sufficient number of scenarios of potential outcomes.  The event trees relevant to the work 
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presented in this paper, namely event trees for collision, grounding, impact and flooding from 
other causes, are illustrated in Figures 2 to 5. 
Assignment of branch probabilities in the event trees of Figures 2 to 5 was done using accident 
statistics for the period 1994-2004, results from past relevant research studies (such as the Joint 
North West European Project, DNV Technica, 1996, and the HARDER project) and, where 
necessary, expert judgment. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the risk calculations carried out, whilst Figure 6 presents the F-N 
curve calculated by the risk model.  Comparing Figure 1 (historical risk) with Figure 6 (risk 
as calculated by the risk model), it can be seen that the prediction offered by the risk model 
is conservative with regards to the historical risk corresponding to the period 1994 – 2004, 
but certainly well below the historical risk of the period 1978 – 1994 for North West 
European waters.  As such, it can be considered a reasonable and adequate basis for 
evaluating the cost-effectiveness of the RCOs examined.  
RISK CONTROL OPTIONS  
Improved damage stability and survivability after flooding to avoid rapid capsize relates to the 
ability to stay afloat and upright for as long as necessary to allow for recovery of the vessel, safe 
continuation of the voyage or safe return to port, assistance to the vessel, or ultimately to allow 
for safe and orderly abandonment of the vessel.   
Stability deterioration due to a magnitude of causes and subsequent flooding to internal 
compartments, had led in the past to major loss of life on RoPax ships (MV Herald of Free 
Enteprise, MV Estonia, MV Jan Heveliusz, MV Express Samina, MV El Salam Bocaccio, 
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among others). Hence damaged ship stability is one of the fundamental areas of safety 
legislation as it deals with mitigating the consequences of water ingress related flooding.  
The capsize mechanism of RoPax ships or any other ships with large un-subdivided horizontal 
spaces near the damaged waterline is associated with accumulation of water on deck due to wave 
action (see for instance, Tagg and Tuzcu, 2002, and Pawlowski, 2004). The height of the water 
gradually increases until either a reasonably stable equilibrium level is reached where inflow is 
approximately equal to outflow for ships with sufficient reserve stability, or if stability is 
inadequate, the heeling moment of the water will cause the ship to capsize.  On this basis, a 
number of measures are known to be beneficial for the stability of RoPax ships following water 
ingress. Among others, the following can be quoted from (Pawlowski, 2004): 
• Fitting of buoyant spaces (additional reserve buoyancy) on the car deck or below the weather 
deck, as appropriate, along the ship sides. This would increase the GZmax and decrease the 
heeling level due to water accumulated on deck. 
• Use of down-flooding arrangements which counteract the accumulation of water on the 
vehicle deck, and if properly designed, can largely reduce or even eliminate this phenomenon. 
• Application of sheer of the deck and/or trim of the ship to limit the extent of water 
accumulation on deck by increasing water outflow; this is of importance for midship flooding 
cases, the most detrimental for residual stability. 
For new RoPax designs, the above three measures can be effectively incorporated without 
greater difficulties, taking the form of a lifebelt around the ship’s sides, leading to designs of 
unprecedented high levels of survivability (Pawlowski, 1999).  A good illustration of the above 
measures on a RoPax design can be found in a public report of the DESSO project where, the 
vessel was conceived with the philosophy of the ship functioning as “its own lifeboat”.  Among 
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the measures introduced in this design, efficient cross-flooding arrangements (for achieving 
symmetric flooding and avoiding excessive heel) as well as enclosed watertight side casings for 
providing reserve buoyancy up to the first accommodation deck, can be accounted for.  
As the results of risk analysis suggest, rapid capsize – as a consequence of various accident 
categories leading to various extents of flooding, is the main contributor to ship losses and the 
cause of a large number of fatalities. In this sense, during the concept design stages of a new ship 
project, in addition to ‘conventional’ (static stability) design methods for quantifying damage 
stability, the issue of verification of the survival time in cases of flooding would help to improve 
the survivability performance of the ship.  
In relation to the above and for the purpose of the cost-effectiveness study, two high-level RCOs 
have been considered:  
• RCO2a: relates to measures aimed at improving damage stability in a statutory sense only. 
The effectiveness of different measures is quantified on the basis of ‘conventional’ methods 
i.e. static stability calculations and it is expressed with the probabilistic Attained Index of 
Subdivision A.  The explicit issue of the survival time is not directly addressed in Index A 
calculations, although the implicit s factor formulation encodes implicitly information on sea 
state as well as the time the vessel is expected to survive in specific damage conditions. It is 
expected that this RCO would lead to moderate increases of Index A, and that the associated 
costs are not major or significant. 
• RCO2b: relates to improved damage stability as above, but the issue of the survival time is 
also directly and explicitly addressed with a performance-based approach (model tests and/or 
numerical simulations). This will ensure that the problem of rapid capsize is addressed for all 
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possible flooding scenarios and it is not limited to collision damages.  It is assumed that this 
RCO would lead to moderate increases of Index A and that in addition, its implementation 
would also lead to reduce the probability of rapid capsize (as opposed to slow sinking) in 
those situations in which the vessel “does not remain afloat”. This RCO is meant to achieve 
high levels of survivability in line with the concept of “casualty threshold” and safe return to 
port (Vassalos, 2007) therefore the marginal costs associated with RCO2b are expected to be 
much higher than with RCO2a.  
The risk reduction potential of all measures associated with improved damage stability and 
survival time, can be evaluated by assessing the impact of all related measures on the branch 
probabilities of the event trees constituting the (high-level) risk model. Accordingly, the 
maximum risk reduction potential associated with RCO2 is ΔRRmax = 73% (of total PLLbasis) and 
relates to all collisions, groundings, cases of impacts and flooding from other causes.   
RCO2a (improved capability to “stay afloat”)  
All possibilities and specific design solutions associated with implementing RCO2a would lead 
to varying degrees of improved stability after flooding.  This increased level can be quantified in 
terms of Index A (as defined in the newly adopted SOLAS 2009 Chapter II-1 regulations), and 
the improvements would positively impact the probability of “staying afloat” in all collision and 
flooding events defined in the risk model.  
The Required Index of Subdivision R for the representative RoPax vessel adopted in this study is 
equal to R=0.735 and is a function of the subdivision length (Ls) and the number of persons the 
vessel is certified to carry. In the risk model, an Index A of 0.78 (average value of a sample of 38 
RoPax vessels) has been used for the calculation of the basis risk. Since A>R, then the vessel 
10 
 
complies with the probabilistic rules, and the same value of Index A is adopted here for 
consistency. 
According to the concept behind the probabilistic framework, if a ship attains an Index A value 
of 0.78, it can be interpreted as meaning that in 78% of all potential collisions resulting in water 
ingress and flooding, the survival time would – theoretically at least – be 30 minutes1 or more.  
This also means that the remaining 22% of the collisions, the time would be less than 30 minutes!  
For a given damage case, the s factor formulation is assumed to reflect the percentage of cases 
the ship would survive for at least 30 minutes. Accordingly, if s=1.0, the mean survival time 
would tend to infinity, this is assuming of course that the current s factor formulation reflects 
appropriately the conditional probability that the ship will not capsize in a given critical sea state. 
In this respect, the following comments are made with respect to the current s factor formulation 
as adopted in the SOLAS 2009 rules: 
• The positive impact of many design measures to improve damage stability may not be 
reflected in the resulting Index A value (for more details see Vassalos et al, 2006).  
• Recent studies (Vassalos and Jasionowski, 2007) suggest that the s factor formulation 
eventually adopted in the SOLAS 2009 rules is based on a regression of data corresponding 
to conventional cargo ships, which would tend to overestimate (not conservative!) the 
probability of survival of RoPax (low freeboard) ships.  
Consequently, it is not known with certainty whether the s factor formulation adequately reflects 
the true damage stability and the level of survivability of passengers ships, in particular of RoPax 
vessels.  
                                                            
1 Duration of model tests on the basis of which the s factor formulation was derived (Tagg and Tuzcu, 2002) 
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Notwithstanding the above, for the purpose of this study, it can be assumed that Index A is a 
measure of damage stability and as such, any design measure introduced to increase Index A 
value, would lead to a higher probability of “staying afloat”. Thus, a systematic increase from 
A=0.78 (the basis level) up to A=0.99 is considered for estimating the range of risk reduction 
implied by implementing RCO2a.  The impact on the specific branches of the event tree (ET, the 
risk model) is as indicated in Table 3. The results of sensitivity of the risk level to different 
values of Index A, (i.e. to different levels of success in the implementation of these measures) 
are presented in Table 4.   
As can be noted, for example, if the vessel attains an Index A of 0.90, the resulting reduction of 
the total Potential Loss of Life (ΔR) is estimated at 44%; the breakdown into the considered 
accident categories is shown in Table 5 for the A=0.90 case.  The resulting FN curve is 
illustrated in Figure 7. In the extreme case of A=0.99 the level of risk reduction of the total PLL 
in relation to the basis case can be as much as ΔR =63%. 
RCO2b (improved capability to “stay afloat longer”)  
This RCO assumes that all measures implemented are much more effective in achieving the 
design goal of “stay afloat for longer”; it is expected that more effective measures can be 
designed if in addition to ‘conventional’ design verification methods based on static stability, 
state-of-the-art performance-based methods (numerical simulations) are utilised at early design 
stages for verification and systematic improvement of survivability performance not only for 
collision-related damages, but for a range of representative scenarios related to groundings, 
impact and other flooding scenarios. Modern performance-based methods are used for 
verification of structural strength, hull resistance, aerodynamic performance, evacuation, etc. 
12 
 
There is no reason why modern survivability analyses should not be utilised to design and verify 
one of the key safety ship design goals (“stay upright and afloat”) for as long as necessary to 
recover the ship or eventually to allow for safe abandonment. 
Obviously, the impact on survivability can also be expressed in terms of Index A, which is likely 
to be higher than that achieved in RCO2a, as there will be more cases for which the s factor is 
unity, hence survival time would tend to infinity.  In addition to this, for all cases where the ship 
does not remain afloat, the proportion of ‘slow sinking’ to ‘rapid capsize’ is assumed also equal 
to the expected probability of survival (Index A).  In this RCO the confidence in the 
“adequateness” of the s factor formulation implicit in Index A calculations is high. 
The results of sensitivity of the risk level to different values of Index A, (i.e. to different levels of 
success in the implementation of these measures) are illustrated in Tables 6 and 7. As can be 
noted, for example, if the vessel attains an Index A of 0.95, the resulting reduction of the total 
Potential Loss of Life (ΔR) is estimated at 62%; the breakdown into the considered accident 
categories is shown in Table 8 for the A=0.95 case.  The resulting FN curve is illustrated in 
Figure 8. 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS   
Generic Model / Ship System  
For the purpose of evaluating the risk reduction potential (ΔR) and costs (ΔC) of the RCOs 
considered, a representative reference ship has been selected, the main parameters of which are 
presented in Table 7. The parameters of the reference ship correspond to a RoPax vessel with 
capacity for approximately 1,000 passengers and 100 crew, consistently with the assumptions 
made in the risk analysis study. 
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All costs and benefits were depreciated to a Net Present Value (NPV) using a depreciation rate of 
5% and assuming an expected lifetime of 30 years for RoPax ships. 
As the marginal costs are a function of the operational profile of the vessel, a specific 
operational profile was defined as summarised in Table 10, comprising three seasonal 
periods (winter, spring/autumn and summer), in line with the assumptions made in the risk 
model.  Additional assumptions made include operation of 356 out of 365 days per year 
(with 99% availability) and a reference trip of distance 300 nautical miles, travelled at 
average speed of 25 knots in 12 hours. 
On the basis of the cost/revenue unit data presented in Table 11, the corresponding cost-
earning profile is shown in Table 12.  On the basis of these assumptions, the annual total 
revenue is estimated as €18,440,426 whilst the annual operating costs are €17,108,000 
resulting in a net annual profit of €1,322,426 (€731 per cabin and €605 per lane metre). 
On the basis of these operating figures, indicative estimates of marginal costs associated 
with the various design measures implied by introducing RCO2a and RCO2b were made, 
as related to the extent of possible utilisation of the available volumes and deck areas and 
their effects on the layout and capacity of the ship.  Tables 13 and 14 present the marginal 
costs taken into account for RCO2a and RCO2b, respectively. 
CAF Calculation  
The results of cost-effectiveness calculations (GCAF) for RCO2a are illustrated in Figure 9. For 
RCO2b, the results are illustrated in Figure 10; the figures show sensitivity of GCAF to different 
assumptions related to risk reduction and cost. Figures 9 and 10, in conjunction with Figures 7 
and 8, indicate that if the Required Index A for the representative ship is increased from 0.78 to 
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0.90, the measure is cost-effective if the total marginal cost associated with the stability upgrade 
is less than US$9M and US$11M for RCO2a and RCO2b, respectively (since for both cases, the 
associated CAF value is up to US$3M). Experience from Stockholm Agreement stability 
upgrades indicate that such cost can be significantly lower than US$9M. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the work presented in this paper on potential measures aimed at improving 
damage stability and survivability, and assuming that damaged ship survivability is ‘sufficiently’ 
reflected by the attained subdivision index (A), then the required subdivision index (R) should be 
increased so that for the average size ferry (1,100 persons onboard), the R index is above 0.90.  
When a ship attains an A value of A>0.90, it would mean that more than 90% of potential 
collisions would result in survival time of 30 minutes or longer. A high A value (>0.90) would 
also imply that there would be a larger number of damage cases with s=1.0, which, for a given 
damage case, implies infinite mean survival time (t?∞). 
In relation to this conclusion, the following points are noteworthy: 
• Although the current formulation of the required index R is a measure of safety in line with 
current expectations, it does not explicitly relate to risk; it has been established on the basis 
of the attained index from a sample of RoPax ships of SOLAS 90 standard; thus the R index 
may not reflect the level of safety to be expected in the foreseeable future. An attempt to 
relate R more directly to safety would require the use of risk in its derivation. 
• The formulation of the s factor should be urgently revisited for passenger ships, including 
RoPax ships, using relevant reference ships (RoPax) and utilising available performance-
based methods. 
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Finally, on the basis of cost-effectiveness considerations, it is expected that the CAF value 
associated with the introduction of measures to improve survivability in flooded conditions is 
going to be well below the current cost-effectiveness criterion (US$3M), even for pessimistic 
assumptions of marginal costs. Hence it is strongly recommended that the required subdivision 
index R for RoPax vessels be increased to levels at least or above 0.90. 
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Fig. 1: RoPax F-N Curve (Historical Risk) 
 
 
18 
 
ID Probability Frequency
Code per collision per ship year
Minor damage C1 0.529200 6.62E-03
0.84
Impact only C2 0.025200 3.15E-04
0.5
Remains afloat C3.1.1 0.019656 2.46E-04
0.78
Flooding Slow sinking C3.1.2 0.002772 3.47E-05
0.5 Sinking 0.5
Collision under way Struck ship 0.22 Rapid capsize C3.1.3 0.002772 3.47E-05
0.63 0.5 0.5
Minor damage C4.1 0.000000 0.00E+00
Fire 0.5
0 Major damage C4.2 0.000000 0.00E+00
Serious casualty 0.5
0.16
Impact only C2.3 0.047880 5.99E-04
Collision incident 0.95
Remains afloat C3.2.1 0.002218 2.77E-05
Flooding 0.88
Striking ship 0.05 Slow sinking C3.2.2 0.000302 3.78E-06
0.5 0.12
Minor damage C4.3 0.000000 0.00E+00
0.5
Fire Major damage C4.4 0.000000 0.00E+00
0 0.4
Total loss C4.5 0.000000 0.00E+00
0.1
Striking at berth C5/C6 0.370000 4.63E-03
0.37
1.000000 1.25E-02
1.25E-02
Level 3 Level 4Level 2 Level 6Level 5Level 1
per ship year
 
 
Fig. 2: Generic Collision Event Tree 
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 ID Probability Frequency
Code per grounding per ship year
Minor incident G1 0.680000 6.51E-03
0.68
No flooding G1 0.172800 1.65E-03
0.54
Flooding double bottom only G2 0.073600 7.04E-04
Serious casualty 0.23
0.32 Hard aground G3.1 0.047104 4.51E-04
0.64
Flooding above DB
0.23 Remains afloat G3.2.1 0.019872 1.90E-04
0.75
Floats free Slow sinking G3.2.2 0.002252 2.16E-05
0.36 0.085
Rapid capsize G3.2.3 0.004372 4.18E-05
0.165
1.000000 9.57E-03
Grounding incident
9.57E-03
per ship year
Level 3Level 2Level 1 Level 4  
 
Fig. 3: Generic Grounding Event Tree 
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ID Probability Frequency
Code per impact per ship year
Minor incident M1 0.890000 1.11E-02
0.89
No flooding M2 0.083600 1.05E-03
0.76
Serious casualty Remains afloat M3.1 0.022150 2.77E-04
0.11 0.839
Aground upright M3.2 0.002138 2.67E-05
Flooding 0.081
0.24 Slow sinking M3.3 0.001558 1.95E-05
0.059
Rapid capsize M3.4 0.000554 6.93E-06
0.021
1.000000 1.25E-02
Level 3Level 2Level 1
Impact incident
1.25E-02
per ship year
 
Fig. 4: Generic Impact Event Tree 
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ID Probability Frequency
Code per flooding per ship year
Remains afloat L1.1.1 0.023040 5.51E-05
0.4
Through bow door Slow sinking L1.1.2 0.005760 1.38E-05
0.18 0.1
Rapid capsize L1.1.3 0.028800 6.88E-05
0.5
Remains afloat L1.2.1 0.000000 0.00E+00
0.6
Through stern door Slow sinking L1.2.2 0.000000 0.00E+00
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Fig. 5: Generic Flooding Event Tree 
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Fig. 6: RoPax F-N Curve (Risk Model) 
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Fig. 7: Societal Risk Associated with Flooding-Related Outcomes – RCO2a 
(collision, grounding, impact and flooding accident categories included) 
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Fig. 8: Societal Risk Associated with Flooding-Related Outcomes – RCO2b  
(collision, grounding, impact and flooding accident categories included) 
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Fig. 9: GCAF sensitivity to Attained index A and cost implications  
RCO2a: measures improving damage stability (“stay afloat”) 
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Fig. 10: GCAF sensitivity to Attained index A and cost implications  
RCO2b: measures improving damage stability and survival time (“stay afloat for longer”) 
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Table 1: Number of Incidents and Frequencies 
RoPax 1,000 GRT and above (Worldwide, 1994 – 2004)  
 # Incidents 
% Total % Serious 
Frequency (per ship year) 
Total Serious Total Serious 
Collision 194 20 18.4% 11.0% 1.25E-02 1.29E-03 
Contact 193 21 18.3% 11.6% 1.25E-02 1.36E-03 
Fire/Explosion 128 50 12.2% 27.6% 8.28E-03 3.23E-03 
Wrecked/Stranded 148 47 14.1% 26.0% 9.57E-03 3.04E-03 
Hull Damage 35 7 3.3% 3.9% 2.26E-03 4.53E-04 
Foundered 2 2 0.2% 1.1% 1.29E-04 1.29E-04 
Machinery 
damage/failure 
289 31 27.5% 17.1% 1.87E-02 2.00E-03 
Miscellaneous 63 3 6.0% 1.7% 4.07E-03 1.94E-04 
TOTAL 1,052 181 100.0% 100.0% 6.80E-02 1.17E-02 
 
Notes: Data as provided and classified within the LMIU casualty database; Fleet-at-risk is 15,468 ship-years for the period 1994 
– 2004 as provided by the LRFP world fleet statistics. 
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Table 2: Summary Risk Calculations (Risk Model) 
 
Frequency 
(per ship year) 
Frequency 
(%) 
Individual 
Risk  
(per year) 
PLL  
(per ship year) 
PLL  
(%) 
Fatalities   
(per year) 
Collision 1.25E-02 28% 2.75E-05 2.34E-02 11% 31 
Grounding 9.57E-03 21% 3.02E-05 2.57E-02 12% 23 
Impact  1.25E-02 28% 1.63E-06 1.39E-03 1% 2 
Flooding  2.39E-03 5% 1.31E-04 1.12E-01 50% 148 
Fire 8.28E-03 18% 7.00E-05 5.95E-02 27% 79 
TOTAL 4.52E-02 100% 2.61E-04 2.22E-01 100% 282 
 
Note: Groundings are incidents classified by LMIU as “wrecked/stranded”; Impacts are incidents classified by LMIU as 
“contact”; Other Flooding includes incidents classified by LMIU as “hull damage” and “foundered”. 
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Table 3: Impact of RCO2a (Index A=0.90 Case) on the Risk Model 
Accident 
Category ET level 3 
ET branch probability 
change basis Enhanced  
by RCO2a 
Collision  Under way/serious/struck ship/flooding/remains afloat 0.78 0.9 15% 
Grounding  Serious/flood above DB/floats free/remains afloat 0.75 0.9 20% 
Impact  Serious/flooding/remains afloat 0.839 0.9 7% 
Flooding  Wave damage/bow door/remains afloat 0.4 0.9 125% 
Wave damage/stern door/remains afloat 0.6 0.9 50% 
Wave damage/hull/remains afloat 0.7 0.9 29% 
Open doors/bow/remains afloat 0.8 0.9 13% 
Open doors/stern/remains afloat 0.8 0.9 13% 
Below car deck/remains afloat 0.9 0.9 0% 
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Table 4: Risk Reduction from Improved Damage Stability (RCO2a) 
Index A 
Total 
Ind. Risk 
(per year) 
Total PLL 
(per ship year) 
Averted 
fatalities 
per ship 
Total ΔR 
% of PLL 
0.78 basis 2.61E-04 2.22E-01 -  
0.80 3% 2.01E-04 1.71E-01 1.5 23% 
0.85 9% 1.73E-04 1.47E-01 2.2 33% 
0.90 15% 1.46E-04 1.24E-01 2.9 44% 
0.95 22% 1.18E-04 1.00E-01 3.6 55% 
0.99 28% 9.55E-05 8.12E-02 4.2 63% 
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Table 5: Risk Reduction Breakdown after Improving Damage Stability 
(RCO2a - Index A=0.90 Case) 
RCO2a 
A=0.90 
Frequency 
(per ship year) 
Ind. Risk 
(per year) 
PLL 
(per ship year) 
ΔPLL 
(%) 
Collision  1.25E-02 1.27E-05 1.08E-02 54% 
Grounding 9.57E-03 1.15E-05 9.82E-03 60% 
Impact 1.25E-02 1.01E-06 8.62E-04 38% 
Flooding 2.39E-03 5.04E-05 4.28E-02 62% 
Fire 8.28E-03 7.00E-05 5.95E-02 0% 
TOTAL 4.52E-02 1.46E-04 1.24E-01 44% 
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Table 6: Impact of RCO2b (Index A=0.95 Case) on the Risk Model 
Accident 
Category ET level 3 
ET branch probability 
change basis Enhanced  
by RCO2b 
Collision  Under way/serious/struck ship/flooding/remains afloat 0.78 0.95 22% 
 Under way/serious/struck ship/flooding/sinking/slow sinking 0.5 0.95 90% 
                              /striking ship/flooding/remains afloat 0.88 0.95 8% 
Grounding  Serious/flood above DB/floats free/remains afloat 0.75 0.95 27% 
                                                        /slow sinking 0.085 0.048  
Impact  Serious/flooding/remains afloat 0.839 0.95 13% 
                            /sinking 0.059 0.024  
Flooding  Wave damage/bow door/remains afloat 0.4 0.95 128% 
                                       /slow sinking 0.1 0.05  
Wave damage/stern door/remains afloat 0.6 0.95 58% 
                                        /slow sinking 0.3 0.05  
Wave damage/hull/remains afloat 0.7 0.95 36% 
                                        /slow sinking 0.2 0.05  
Open doors/bow/remains afloat 0.8 0.95 19% 
                                       /slow sinking 0.1 0.05  
Open doors/stern/remains afloat 0.8 0.95 19% 
Below car deck/remains afloat 0.9 0.95 6% 
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Table 7: Risk Reduction from Improved Damage Survivability (RCO2b) 
Index A 
Total 
Ind. Risk 
(per year) 
Total PLL 
(per ship year) 
Averted 
fatalities 
per ship 
Total ΔR 
% of PLL 
0.78 basis 2.61E-04 2.22E-01 -  
0.80 3% 1.54E-04 1.31E-01 2.7 40% 
0.85 9% 1.32E-04 1.12E-01 3.2 49% 
0.90 15% 1.14E-04 9.68E-02 3.7 56% 
0.95 22% 9.95E-05 8.47E-02 4.1 62% 
0.99 28% 9.12E-05 7.75E-02 4.3 65% 
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Table 8: Risk Reduction Breakdown after Improving Damage Survivability 
(RCO2b - Index A=0.95 Case) 
RCO 2b 
A=0.95 
Frequency 
(per ship year) 
Ind Risk 
(per year) 
PLL 
(per ship year) 
ΔPLL 
(%) 
Collision  1.25E-02 2.50E-06 2.13E-03 91% 
Grounding 9.57E-03 1.05E-06 9.61E-04 96% 
Impact 1.25E-02 1.10E-07 9.34E-05 93% 
Flooding 2.39E-03 2.59E-05 2.20E-02 80% 
Fire 8.28E-03 7.00E-05 5.95E-02 0% 
TOTAL 4.52E-02 9.95E-05 8.47E-02 62% 
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Table 9: Reference Ship for Evaluation of RCOs 
Parameters Value 
Gross Tonnage, GT 25,000 tons 
Length overall 180 m 
Breadth  25 m 
LSA Capacity  
Passengers 
Crew 
1,100 
1,000 
100 
No. cabins / 2 capacity 
No. cabins / 4 capacity 
50 
225 
Total lane metres 1,900 m 
Lightweight  12,000 tons 
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Table 10: Reference Vessel Operational Profile 
 season Low 
(winter) 
Middle 
(spring / autumn) 
High 
(summer) 
annual number of trips No. service days 89 178 89 
Return trips / day (daily frq) 1 1 1 
Return trips per year 89 178 89 
Annual breakdown 25% 50% 25% 
pax / vehicle distribution cars 90 150 301 
bus 5 8 3 
lorries 80 60 7 
trailer 100 90 40 
loading profile lane metres used 1885 1845 1454 
lane metres usage (% of max) 99.2% 97.1% 76.5% 
Pax (car&bus) / trip 420 690 993 
Pax (drivers) / trip 80 60 7 
Pax total / trip 500 750 1000 
Level of service 50% 75% 100% 
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Table 11: Unit Cost Data  
pertaining to item value units 
design / construction consultant hourly rate 90 EUR / hour 
price of steel work per hour (EU) 6,000 EUR / ton 
yard cost rate 20 EUR / hour 
tickets prices pax 37.4 EUR / person / trip 
Car (3 pax / 4 m) 52 EUR / vehicle / trip 
Bus (30 pax / 15 m) 196 EUR / vehicle / trip 
Lorry (1 pax / 15 m) 196 EUR / vehicle / trip 
Trailer (2.5 m) 33 EUR / vehicle / trip 
onboard sales car / bus pax 5 EUR / person / trip 
lorry driver 5 EUR / person / trip 
operational cost fuel 120 EUR / ton 
crew wages 280 EUR / day / person 
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Table 12: Reference Cost / Earning Profile for the Calculation of Marginal Costs 
season winter spring / autum summer annual sums
 
 
revenue profile pax tiquets sale / trip 15,686€               25,770€               37,086€               
pax onboard sales / trip 2,500€                 3,750€                 5,000€                 
cargo revenue (vehicles) / trip 23,834€               22,727€               18,596€               
total revenue / trip 42,020€               52,247€               60,682€               
revenue pax / season 1,618,539€          5,254,486€          3,745,635€          10,618,660€      
revenur cargo / season 2,121,239€          4,045,459€          1,655,067€          7,821,765€        
total annual revenue / season 3,739,778€          9,299,945€          5,400,703€          18,440,426€     
annual revenue per cabin 42,475€             
annual revenue per lane m 4,117€               
cost profile total distance (nm) 53400 106800 53400
fuel consumption (MT) 10680 21360 10680 sum
fuel cost (EUR) 1,281,600€          2,563,200€          1,281,600€          5,126,400€        
crew wages 2,990,400€          5,980,800€          2,990,400€          11,961,600€      
maintenance 20,000€             
total annual cost 17,108,000€     
annual running cost per cabin 41,744€             
annual running cost per lan m 3,512€               
1,332,426€       
annual profit per cabin 731€                  
annual profit per meter lane 605€                  
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Table 13: Indicative Order of Magnitude of Marginal Costs ΔC associated with RCO2a 
 
RCO 2a (A=0.95) 
stakeholder item increase units   
owner additional tons of steel (1% lightweight) 123.79 tons   
builder + yard additional hours of design work 1000 h   
operator Reduced lane metres 200 m   
operator Reduced cabins 10     
       
stakeholder item initial (capital) cost  €      792,759  
owner increased design costs  
(fixed price) 
 €       15,000     
builder increased design costs  
(fixed price) 
 €       15,000     
owner increased construction costs  
(due to added weight) 
 €      742,759     
builder increased construction costs  
(commissioning) 
 €       20,000     
       
stakeholder item annual (running) cost  €      129,327  
owner cost of reduced capacity  
(car deck space) 
 €      121,015     
owner cost of possible increased maintenance  €         1,000     
owner  cost of reduced capacity  
(accommodation spaces) 
 €         7,311     
       
Increase in cost PV   $   3,075,531   €   2,248,688   
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Table 14: Indicative Order of Magnitude of Marginal Costs ΔC associated with RCO2b 
 
RCO 2b (A=0.95) 
stakeholder item increase units   
owner additional tons of steel (5% lightweight) 618.97 tons   
builder + yard additional hours of design work 5000 h   
operator Reduced lane metres 50 m   
operator Reduced cabins 10     
       
stakeholder item initial (capital) cost  €   3,843,793 
owner increased design costs 
 (fixed price) 
 €       15,000     
builder increased design costs 
 (fixed price) 
 €       15,000     
owner increased construction costs 
 (due to added weight) 
 €   3,713,793    
builder increased construction costs  
(commissioning) 
 €      100,000    
       
stakeholder item annual (runing) cost  €        38,565 
owner cost of reduced capacity 
 (car deck space) 
 €       30,254     
owner cost of possible increased maintenance  €         1,000     
owner  cost of reduced capacity  
(accommodation spaces) 
 €         7,311     
       
Increase in cost NPV  $   5,850,952   €   4,277,950 
 
 
 
 
 
